The Dog Ate Some Of My Homework
Musings On History And Political Economics
Sunday, February 10, 2019
BOOK REPORT (and personal essay): John Quincy Adams, Militant Spirit
This is the best biography of J.Q.A. I've read, by a wide margin. It's actually a history of ante-bellum America (if you already have some context). Adams was in politics and diplomacy for 50 years, from 1794 to 1848. He was the Forrest Gump of his era, except that he wasn't a bystander. The factoids that James Traub presents, sometimes almost as an aside, answer a lot of questions: "Didn't they foresee that...?" and "Howcum nobody said that [blah, blah, blah]...?" It turns out that they did, and debated it thoroughly, in Congress and the press.
My interest in the Civil War started early. I'd read Bruce Catton's trilogy on the Army Of The Potomac before I was well into my teens; my Dad took me on father-son road trips to Gettysburg and Antietam. (I still remember a small pink-and-white mobile home in or near the West Wood at Antietam, something the National Park Service removed long ago.) The thought (and question) that naturally occurs to a Civil War neophyte is "What a waste, all those dead soldiers, brother-against-brother, how did they get themselves into this mess, and why didn't they try to prevent it?"
It might be that trying to answer this question was what focused my interest on the period from the Founding to Fort Sumpter. After all, America was a self-created country. We didn't have a history of constant war (except with indians) and ancient grievances, like Europe. How do you start with a clean sheet of paper and end up, 70 years later, in a catastrophic war?
"When I came up" (around 1960), the now thoroughly discredited "Dunning School" of historiography still held sway. Or at least was holding its own. The Dunning School held that it was a failure of political leadership, an almost willful, cynical, manipulation by self-interested politicians, that led to the Civil War. If they had worked harder, in a more statesmanlike way, at sectional compromise, the whole thing could have been prevented. But they didn't live up to the standards of the Founders and mismanaged the country. Who to blame? "The politicians." I was still reading "Dunning School" stuff in college and graduate school. But anyone who came of age in the modern Civil Rights era could see that there was a problem with the Dunning School: "Wait a minute... Isn't the stuff I'm seeing on the news every night now what they were arguing about from 1800 to 1860?"
It was, at least in great measure. But the national experience of the Great Depression and World War Two had changed the lens through which the North viewed the South. The moral arguments of Martin Luther King Jr. and the confrontational non-violence of "the kids" were unanswerable. Before Dr. King went to Chicago, northern liberals (like me) were smug in our condemnation of the South. Even northern racists were no longer comfortable with de jure apartheid in the South. (We all learned, soon enough, that most white people were mostly comfortable with de facto segregation.)
It's worth remembering that most of the Founders, including many southern ones, thought that slavery would eventually die of natural causes in a few decades. It turns out that that stuff we learned in high school about Eli Whitney's cotton gin was true. Switching from tobacco to cotton, efficient preparation of cotton for manufacturing, and new western land rescued slavery. By the 1830's formerly anti-slavery Southerners were defending slavery as "a way of life." The most vociferous defended it as "a positive good" (for everyone, including slaves). John Quincy Adams marveled that the otherwise fine mind of a contemporary who he had admired--John C. Calhoun--could be as corrupted as it was by slavery. Adams felt that he had seen it happen. Calhoun, educated at Yale and a nationalist "War Hawk" in 1812, and with whom Adams worked comfortably under President Monroe, had become a monomaniac on slavery and defending sectional Southern interests by the mid 1820's.
As for Henry Clay, another giant of the era, Adams began thinking him an unprincipled and ambitious man, came to admire him, and ended up thinking him an unprincipled and ambitious man. Adams never considered Daniel Webster anything but an unprincipled man. J.Q.A. was not a generous judge of his peers (or himself).
As for the politics of slavery, everybody, to one degree or another, saw it coming as a train wreck. Adams saw Clay's Compromise of 1820 as a harbinger of Big Trouble to come. He was then about age 50, at the height of his powers and considered judgement as a politician. Thomas Jefferson, long-retired and with 6 years to live, heard the Compromise "as a fire bell in the night." Adams, privately (in his diary) concluded that he was personally anti-slavery but that there was little to be gained in agitating against it in politics because the country had shrugged its shoulders and heaved a sigh of relief at Clay's compromise.
Adams developed idiosyncratic views on abolitionism as time wore on. Although he was a hero to abolitionists for his firey opposition to the Gag Rule in the House Of Representatives, he did not believe that immediate abolition was possible or desirable. Neither did he believe that gradual emancipation and more-or-less forced emigration to Africa was realistic. He thought the American Colonization Society, of which Henry Clay was a member and which Abraham Lincoln endorsed in principle as a rising star in Illinois politics, was foolish. Clay and Lincoln believed that whites would never live peacefully side-by-side with blacks who had equal rights. Adams, who always considered black people as fully human and equal, asked "Why would several million black people, who have never known a home other than here, voluntarily deport themselves to Africa? And why should the United States, a vociferously anti-colonial nation, support colonialism in Africa?" As the 1830's and '40's wore on, Adams worked more and more closely with abolitionists. But he never endorsed immediate emancipation, compensated or otherwise. He thought it was politically unworkable.
Adams had a similarly fraught relationship with American expansionism and Manifest Destiny. He was always dismissive of indian rights. He believed that hunter-gatherer cultures were demonstrably inferior to European-based farming and manufacturing culture. The indians were in the way: they had to go. There was no daylight between Adams and Andrew Jackson on "the indian question," and Jackson was a man that Adams otherwise despised, as a human being and a public man. Basically, Adams was all-in for getting all the territory America could get, from sea to shining sea. He thought Jefferson's Louisiana Purchase was brilliant. He tried to buy all of Florida, and did buy what we now call "the Redneck Riviera." He negotiated the first treaty that gave America transcontinental claims--aggressively--that's what he wanted. He was all-in for doing a deal with the British to make Oregon American.
Except, except...
He reversed his position on the acquisition of Cuba because he came to see it as a slaveholders' boondoggle. He reversed his position on the acquisition of Texas because... ditto. At first, Adams was all-in for buying Texas from Mexico. He came to see the entire Texas project as a slaveholding State pretext to create as many as 4 new slaveholding States by "whatever means necessary." He was as skeptical as Lincoln and other Whigs about the whole "Texas independence / annexation / pretexts for starting the Mexican War" thing. Adams favored the diplomatic recognition of Haiti, as consistent with American anti-imperialism. This enraged southerners, for whom slave rebellion was a nightmare.
Adams came to skepticism about his own expansionist beliefs. He was for New England expansionism: small freeholder farms, commerce, manufacturing, "infrastructure." He came to see the 3/5 clause in the Constitution as a poison pill. The South was--and always would be--over-represented in the national government. Adams wanted a strong national government yoked to personal freedom and economic development. At, we may say in today's lingo, "taxpayer expense."
He didn't see any way out. Adams came to believe that the American story would end in a slave insurrection, or civil war, or both. He foresaw that "the slavocracy" (his phrase) would accept nothing less than control of the national government. Slavery would never "go quietly, into that good night." Adams didn't live to see the Compromise of 1850, the Kansas-Nebraska Act, "squatter sovereignty," the Dred Scott case. He didn't live to see Lincoln elected on a platform of "no further expansion of slavery," and secession. But he predicted it, or something like it. This was a man born in 1767, who came of age during the Founding, who spent 50 years in politics and diplomacy at the highest levels, with intelligence and insight far superior to most of his peers. And he didn't see any way out but civil war.
The 3 things I got out of this book:
1) People, at least those who were paying attention, 1800-1850, knew damned well what was going on. All you have to do is read Traub's mentions of some detail of J.Q.A.'s private correspondence or diary entries. 2) They weren't stupid. A lot of smart minds wrestled with basic problems for 50 years. We still had a Civil War. 3) They remind me of us. We know better. What have the last 50 years of politics, 1968-2018, been, if not about denial?
Sunday, January 14, 2018
Anatomy Of Failure (by Harlan Ullman)
This is a good, critiqued, book talk. The view is from 30,000 feet. And in that sense, the points that Ullman and his commenters make are "...duh..." The problem is implementation. In the first place, foreign and military policy aren't made in a vacuum--they are (and always have been) intertwined with domestic politics. In the second place, thoughtful experts who finally get a shot at conducting foreign affairs always find that solutions that look obvious from the outside are hard to implement from the inside.
The speakers make some good points about conducting foreign and military policy in a post-Cold War environment. But Ullman (at least, if not others) accept the U.S.'s responsibility for running, or at least leading, an international empire. There's not much "leading from behind" here. Ullman seems to believe that an Obama approach is, by its nature, abdication of U.S. responsibility. His quarrel with George W. Bush is not that he led "from the front," but that he chose the wrong policy options.
Anyway. The discussion is thought-provoking. Maybe it's not so much a guide for senior policy makers as a guide for citizens who want to evaluate the policies of political candidates.
https://www.c-span.org/video/?438330-2/anatomy-failure
Wednesday, October 11, 2017
BOOK REPORT: The Norman Conquest, by Marc Morris
My nephew was reading this book at our family reunion. It looked interesting. It was. I know my English history, more or less, from the reign of Henry II forward. From the departure of the Romans to Henry I, my ignorance was vast. Morris's book is detailed, careful, and judicious--and readable.
I had an impression that the Norman conquest was good for England: it brought it into the then-modern world because Normandy was state-of-the-art for medieval Europe. The view Morris left me with was that some things were lost and some things were gained. England was not England-as-we-know-it before William the Conquerer's invasion in 1066. Culturally, it was more like Scandinavia. For that matter, Normandy was not "French" yet. But the Norsemen who invaded and settled in Normandy had become more "European"--more like the Holy Roman Empire--in the generations they had lived there. By medieval standards, they ran "an administrative state."
For example, England had slavery before the Conquest. Slavery had ceased to exist in Normandy much earlier. England's political and military culture was "barbarian" before the Conquest: assassination was not unusual and victors customarily killed the vanquished. Normandy already had the beginnings of chivalry: if an opponent yielded or an opposing army surrendered, their lives were spared. Feudalism (the idea of reciprocal obligations between lord and subject) was more advanced in Normandy. (We do not normally think of feudalism being "advanced," but it was a step forward from Scandinavia's more tribal, rape-and-pillage culture.)
William was a reformer. Before his arrival, the English Catholic Church had been comparatively relaxed. He teamed up with two Popes and several Bishops (appointed by him) to insist on celibacy for the clergy and to remove the last vestiges of paganism and vernacular worship. This coincided with a massive building program of (big) new cathedrals in the thoroughly modern Romanesque style, imported from Normandy. As an admirer of relaxed religion and classy architecture, I found myself of two minds about William's achievements in religion.
What William and his Bishops did for churches, he and his Barons did for castles. Stone castles, previously unknown in England, went up all over England in the decades after 1066. They were for defense and dominance as well as residence. The Tower Of London, one of William's own special projects, was one of them. Its exterior looks much the same now as it did when it went up. This was military domination in spades. Although there were several rebellions against William after the Battle Of Hastings, the complete domination of England was not in doubt if he and his vassals could operate from stone castles with sufficient bodies of knights.
Changes in society were the most interesting to me. The Normans decapitated the English aristocracy. No significant nobles in the top ranks of the aristocracy were Brits. They were almost entirely disinherited from land ownership in favor of Normans. They became lesser gentry. The same "cram down" effect operated on England's former lesser gentry and freemen. The only Englishmen to benefit from the Conquest were slaves. Slaves disappeared from England entirely buy about 1100.
Latin replaced English as the official language and French as the language of the upper classes. Why did the English language survive? Wikipedia says because its Germanic grammar was simple. Both Wiki and Morris agree that the Normans added mostly (French) loan words. Morris makes two additional good points. 1) English was already a written language. It never entirely disappeared from the records and chronicles of lower order monasteries and secular life. 2) About 8000 Normans became permanent residents of England and intermarried. Morris says the language became a creole mix. That seems a bit strong. As the vernacular crept up into the resident upper classes again, it remained Germanic in grammar with loan words or derived words from French. This is the language known as Middle English today (roughly, 1100-1500).
Why did England survive? Partly because William and his successors (including Henry II and Richard I) were primarily interested in France. They spent 60% or more of their time there. And (the Conquest itself aside) more of their military efforts. England became the cash (and soldier) cow for continental wars. William and Henry II couldn't solve the problem of maintaining an empire that spanned the English Channel. The problem of Henry II's succession ("too many sons") was eerily foreshadowed by an identical problem upon William's death. Henry II's son John settled the problem for good by losing all of his French possessions and his absolute power in England too, with Magna Carta. His Barons became tired of being cash cows for his continental adventures. This gave England the time and space to sort out its own identity and culture.
Tuesday, October 10, 2017
INTRODUCTION
This blog is where I'll discuss some of the books I've read (mostly history). These will be "book reports." "Reviews" is too pretentious a term.
Also links to interesting stuff seen on "Book TV" (C-SPAN2) and "American History TV" (C-SPAN3).
Also, from time to time, my own views on public and international affairs: the ramblings of an educated layman.
Also links to interesting stuff seen on "Book TV" (C-SPAN2) and "American History TV" (C-SPAN3).
Also, from time to time, my own views on public and international affairs: the ramblings of an educated layman.
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BOOK REPORT (and personal essay): John Quincy Adams, Militant Spirit
This is the best biography of J.Q.A. I've read, by a wide margin. It's actually a history of ante-bellum America (if you alre...
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This is the best biography of J.Q.A. I've read, by a wide margin. It's actually a history of ante-bellum America (if you alre...